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Abstract
A key challenge for cybersecurity defense is to detect the en-
cryption Remote Control Trojan (RAT) communication traces.
It is still an open research problem to detect encryption RAT
preciously in different environments. Previous studies in this
area either cannot handle the encrypted content or perform un-
stable in a different environment. To tackle both problems, we
present MBTree, a novel host-level signature based approach
for encryption RAT traffic detection. MBTree consists of a
structure named MLTree and a similarity matching mecha-
nism. The MLTree integrates multiple directed packet payload
size sequences as a host signature. Furthermore, the matching
mechanism compares two MLTree to decide if an alarm is
triggered. Compared with previous related studies, MBTree
(i) is more accurate to characterize different encryption RATs;
(ii) has more robust performance when emerging new benign
applications in the test environment; (iii) can automatically
create signatures from malicious traffic without requiring hu-
man interaction. For evaluation, we collect traffic from mul-
tiple sources and reorganize them in a sophisticated manner.
The experiment results demonstrate that our proposed method
is more precise and robust, especially in the situation with
new emerging applications.
1 Introduction
Modern network attacks are accomplished with advanced
automatic tools. One of them used in the post-penetration
procedure is the RAT with encrypted tunnels. These types
of RAT can lurk in the victim machine for a long time to
complete damage operation and steal confidential files [5].
While specifying RAT activities can cut off the kill chain
and prevent further losses. It is of great importance for RAT
detection.
The traditional RAT detection relies on previously defined
signatures, including IP, domain name, specific content string
pattern, scripts, and others. When the monitored traffic con-
tains one of the signatures, a corresponding alarm is triggered
for further response. Compared with others, this signature
method is more reliable and convenient. Thus, it is still ap-
plied in multiple security products, ranging from intrusion
detection systems (IDS) to firewall [11]. However, as the tech-
niques used in RAT is developing, this method is seriously
challenged by undetectable encrypted content because the
traditional signatures are invalid to identify the malicious
communications [20, 33].
In recent years, the computer security community mainly
focused on machine learning techniques in encryption RAT
detection [13, 14, 17, 19, 22, 34, 41, 44, 46]. Although these
methods have shown significant improvements in handling the
encrypted content, there are still apparent limitations among
them: (1) unstable in different environments. Most machine
learning methods try to learn the classification boundary be-
tween benign and malicious. This strategy makes the training
process of models need not only malicious traffic but also
benign traffic [21]. However, in different environments, the
benign applications are different and keep changing day by
day. In such a situation, when transferring a trained model
into a different environment, the unknown applications not ap-
peared in the training procedure can badly confuse the model.
(2) require large amounts of proper training data. Sufficient
proper data is crucial for training machine learning models.
Since most training models rely on the statistical of the data,
they can hardly achieve perfect performance with only limited
training instances. Besides, to meet this requirement, manual
preprocessing should be taken since most of the data collected
from the real environment do not satisfy the input format and
contains invalid records. (3) lack of interpretability. Most ma-
chine learning models work as black-box, which means we
can only acquire a little knowledge about the results. More-
over, this mechanism can hardly help the security analyst
dig out the trigger of alarms or provide knowledge about the
malicious behavior.
Our Contribution In this paper, we study the problem of
detecting encryption RAT based on network behavior analysis.
Unlike the mainstream of previous research based on machine
learning models, we propose a novel signature method for
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RATs detection, called Malicious network Behavior Tree (MB-
Tree), to make up for the shortcoming of traditional signature
methods in the encryption context and avoid the problems
brought by machine learning methods. Motivated by the ob-
servation that RATs usually follows the fixed-code procedure
to establish or release the connection, we use the directed
packet payload size (DirPiz) of a session as primary finger-
prints. As our observation, the DirPiz can be used to identify
the malicious handshake, as well as handwave behaviors for
encryption RAT detection. There are several advantages us-
ing DirPiz sequence as signatures: (i) effective for encrypted
traffic. Since DirPiz requires no information about the traffic
content, it can also adapt to the encrypted context. Moreover,
in previous studies, the DirPiz sequences have already been
shown effective for identifying encrypted applications and IoT
devices events [26, 39]. (ii) stable in different environments.
According to our observation, the DirPiz sequences of most
samples keep unchanged on different machines. Thus, they
can be used across different environments to acquire robust
performance. (iii) convenient to extract. The DirPiz can be
generated from a pcap or pcapng format file in an automated
way. Compared with traditional signatures, this signature is
more convenient, requiring little manual work.
However, only using DirPiz to identify encryption RAT is
not precise enough. Because potential DirPiz conflicts can oc-
cur between encryption RAT and benign applications, which
can increase the risk of false alarms. To tackle the challenge,
we propose the multi-level tree (MLTree) structure as a more
accurate description of the malicious behavior. Roughly, we
integrate different flow-level DirPiz into host-level MLTree to
improve the unique degree of malicious behaviors. Multiple
malicious traces are organized in a hierarchy structure with
recording the frequency of DirPiz at each level. In such a way,
we can use DirPiz statistics to identify automated behavior by
differentiating static packets and dynamic packets. Individu-
ally, in the interaction procedure, the distribution of DirPiz is
scattered because packets transfer dynamic information like
the execution results of commands. While in the automated
procedure, the distribution is DirPiz is concentrated because
packets transfer static information to complete specific ac-
tions.
In our design, MLTree provides several advantages. First,
MLTree can capture unique malicious behavior accurately.
With recording the statistics of DirPiz, the typical handshake
or handwave behavior can be highlighted in MLTree to cap-
ture the malicious activities precisely. Moreover, more im-
portantly, compared to matching a flow fingerprints DirPiz
sequence, matching a host signature MLTree requires enough
malicious traffic evidence. Thus the false alarms triggered
by only a few coincidence DirPiz can be avoided. Second,
MLTree signatures can be efficiently managed. Based on the
hierarchy structure, we design a merging mechanism to inte-
grate related signatures. Thus multiple malicious traces can
be represented within a single signature to reduce the storage
cost and detection cost. Third, MLTree can be created automat-
ically to adapt scale signatures creation. The entire signature
creation procedure, including DirPiz extraction and MLTree
construction, can be realized automatically with traffic pre-
processing libraries. This characteristic can release security
experts from tedious work of manual signature formulation.
In the detection procedure, we propose a similarity match-
ing mechanism to replace the exact matching strategy adopted
in most previous signature studies. The mechanism is de-
signed based on MLTree structure to facilitate unique auto-
mated behavior detection. Roughly, the similarity between
a testing instance and a signature consists of two parts, the
handshake similarity, and the handwave similarity. Both the
two parts similarity consists of a comparison of continuous
edges as path score, and a comparison of diverse nodes as
node score. Based on the synthesis of the four scores and the
predefined threshold, it can be decided if the traffic should
be regarded as malicious. Compared to the exact matching
strategy, the proposed mechanism can cover deviations from
the generated signatures, and adjust the alarm level of the
detection by the threshold. Thus, this strategy is more flexible
and appropriate for our novel signatures.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, we con-
duct solid experiments on two carefully designed datasets.
The first dataset consists of several open source RATs traffic
as the malicious part, and two public encrypted applications
traffic sets as the benign part. The second dataset consists
of wild trojan traffic as the malicious part and the same be-
nign part with the first dataset. For persuasive evaluation, both
datasets are divided into three parts using the stratified sam-
pling strategy. With the strategy, we can simulate the situation
that the test sets contain unknown applications by dividing
traffic according to its applications. To acquire stable results,
we also integrate the 5-fold cross-validation strategy. The
experiment results show that MBTree yields a more accurate
performance than machine learning state-of-the-arts on the
test sets. Individually, MBTree can achieve 99% Acc and
99% F1 on the first dataset, and 98 % Acc and 89 % F1 on
the second dataset. Moreover, we also inspect the malicious
behaviors by tunning parameters of MBTree and inspecting
generated MLTree signatures.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose the MLTree structure integrating multiple
DirPiz sequences as a novel signature to depict encryp-
tion RAT handshake as well as handwave behavior.
• We propose a similar based matching strategy based on
MLTree to enhance the flexibility of detection.
• We show that the proposed MBTree method can adapt
to the rigorous situation with limited training instances
and unknown benign applications.
• We deepen the proposed MBTree by tunning parameters
and analyzing the produced signatures.
2
2 Related Work
MBTree makes contributions to the problem of encryption
RAT traffic detection. A central idea behind MBTree is adopt-
ing the DirPiz as signatures. Below, we discuss related works
in the above areas from three perspectives.
Machine Learning Based Encryption RAT Detection In
recent decades, machine learning methods for RAT traffic de-
tection have been widely studied [13, 14, 17, 19, 22, 34, 41,
44, 46]. Generally, most of these methods follow such proce-
dure that first extract features from the traffic, and then using
statistical models to fit the data. Recently, [13, 17, 34, 35]
use side-channel information with Random Forest (RF) for
encrypted malicious traffic detection. Specifically, these side-
channel features range from packet length, packet interval
time to payload ratio. The experiment results have shown the
effectiveness of the combination of side-channel features and
machine learning models.
Besides, advanced deep learning models are also adopted
in this area. Compared with traditional machine learning mod-
els, these models do not require the feature extraction pro-
cedure. The sophisticated models can automatically extract
related features, and achieve end-to-end classification. For ex-
ample, [22] proposes a deep learning method to detect HTTP
malicious traffic on mobile networks. [46] proposes a so-
phisticated deep learning architecture to detect trojans with
hierarchy spatiotemporal features. Generally, these traditional
machine learning methods and advanced deep learning meth-
ods can achieve high performance in their experiments. How-
ever, they can hardly adapt to the situation of existing unseen
applications beyond the training set. Moreover, they both lack
interpretability to trace back the cause of alarms for further
response.
Signature Based RAT Detection Compared with machine
learning methods, signature methods are more robust among
different environments. They aim at capturing specific mali-
cious network fingerprints. However, there exist two limita-
tions of traditional signature methods. First, most methods
require manual work to produce high-quality signatures. This
manual work is tedious for security analysts. Second, tra-
ditional signatures mainly use specific strings as signatures
to identify malicious behaviors[12, 27, 29]. However, these
signatures can hardly adapt to encrypted context.
In previous studies, various of them try to tackle the first
problem. They mainly focus on the automatic generation
of network signatures [25, 28, 32, 38]. For example, [25]
propose three automatically generated signatures ranging
from conjunction signatures, token-subsequence signatures
to Bayes signatures for polymorphic worm detection with
traffic payload. [28] uses clustered malicious traces to pro-
duce network-level signatures from HTTP fields automati-
cally. These network-level signatures are translated in a for-
mat compatible with Snort rules and can be used for detection.
However, all these studies are still blocked by the encrypted
content.
Encrypted Traffic Identification Encrypted network com-
munication not only brought challenges to network defense
but also to network management, like the quality of service
management (QoS). As countermeasures, several studies also
use machine learning methods [4, 7, 10, 18, 31, 37] and deep
learning methods [2, 3, 9, 23] for encrypted traffic applica-
tion classification. Recently, [9] propose a sophisticated deep
learning architecture for encrypted traffic identification. Inter-
estingly, [9] taking both reassembled payload and time related
features as input. Their experiment results show a robust per-
formance than other deep learning methods.
Apart from these researches, novel signature methods are
proposed to tackle the encrypted content challenge. Instead of
using specific strings as signatures, these novel methods use
other perspective information to identify specific behaviors,
like packet size sequence. For example, [26] propose an en-
crypted traffic pattern language based on packet payload size
sequence for scalable Over-The-Top (OTT) applications iden-
tification. They show that this signature is unique to identify
applications or even the application events. Similarly, [39]
proposes a method based on packet length pairs to identify
specific events of home IoT devices. In order to achieve the
fine-grained event level traffic detection, [39] adopt the DB-
SCAN algorithm to search frequent conversation pairs, and
then concatenate the pairs into sequences as signatures.
However, these previous studies cannot be directly used
for encryption RAT detection because of listed limitations:
(i) Only using a flow-level packet size sequence is not ac-
curate enough. Since several RATs can establish different
connections to evade the detection [5, 20], only flow-level fin-
gerprints can hardly cover the whole picture of the encryption
RAT behaviors. Hence, we propose an integration structure
MLTree as an enhancement of DirPiz sequences for host-
level detection. (ii) The exact matching strategy adopted is
not flexible enough. Although the exact matching strategy can
cooperate with the finite state machine to improve efficiency,
it lacks the flexibility to capture similar behaviors among dif-
ferent environments. Hence, we propose a similar matching
mechanism to facilitate the robust detection of RATs.
3 MBTree Overview
In this section, we provide an overview of the proposed MB-
Tree system. As shown in Figure 1, our approach consists
of two main procedures. Specifically, first, the raw traffic
is formulated to MLTree, representing host-level behaviors
through three steps. The preprocessing achieves traffic clean-
ing and session reassembling. After that, we extract the DirPiz
from each session as multiple independent sequences. Next,
we correlate these sequences based on common hosts and
construct MLTree as the host behavior. In this procedure,
malicious traffic and testing traffic follow the same steps to
produce signatures and testing instances respectively. Second,
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Figure 1: High-level overview of MBTree
the converted testing instances are compared to each signa-
ture to decide if they match any malicious behaviors through
two steps. The first step calculates the similarity between the
testing instance and each signature to produce the similarity
vector. Then the second step predicts whether the instance
belongs to malicious based on the similarity vector.
To show the workflow clearly, we also provide a simplified
example throughout the following sections to show the key
design of MBTree. The example uses a part of pure Quasar
traffic as malicious traffic, and a part of mixed Quasar traffic
and WhatsApp traffic as testing traffic, as shown in Figure 2.
4 Host Behavior Formulation
In this section, we describe the details of the formulation pro-
cedure from raw traffic to host behaviors MLTree. Section 4.1
introduces the cleaning and session reassemble strategy, Sec-
tion 4.2 shows our consideration of DirPiz extraction, and Sec-
tion 4.3 provides the definition of MLTree and corresponding
construction process.
4.1 Preprocessing
The raw traffic is usually captured in pcap or pcapng format
recording all communication content, including extra meta
information. Since the host behavior comes from valid ses-
sions in our consideration, we first apply traffic cleaning to
discard invalid packets and session reassembling to recover
these communications.
Cleaning Traffic cleaning aims at filtering out redundant
information in raw traffic. As the requirements of cleaned traf-
fic for signature and testing instance formulation are different,
we apply different strategies for the two sets. For the training
set, we apply a ’whitelist’ strategy to only reserve the packets
containing malicious IPS. Thus, only pure malicious packets
are selected to produce valid signatures. For the testing set, we
apply a ’blacklist’ strategy only to discard packets that meet
the following conditions: (1) repeated packets, (2) loop pack-
ets, (3) non-transmission packets. Thus, we can reserve most
of the packets in testing traffic to avoid potential malicious
packets bypassing.
Session reassembling After cleaned, the traffic is reassem-
bled into sessions to recover all end-to-end communication. In
this procedure, we mainly based on 5-tuple to identify a trans-
mission session. The 5-tuple includes source IP, destination
IP, source port, destination port, and protocol. Besides, for
TCP protocol, the flag fields representing the communication
status are also used to identify unique sessions accurately.
4.2 DirPiz Extraction
Given a reassembled session, we extract specific DirPiz of the
session as a sequence to fingerprint the automated handshake
as well as handwave behavior. Specifically, a DirPiz sequence
typically consists of the payload size with the direction in a
connection. The direction means the packet is either request
from the client to the server or response from the server to the
client. As a matter of fact, multiple types of meta-information
of the packet can be extracted as fingerprint, such as packet
gap intervals, and packet payload hash. However, they either
lack stable performance in different network environments
or not adapt to variable encrypted content for the dynamic
encryption key negotiation mechanism. As a result, we choose
the DirPiz as the meta information for its robust performance.
Specific procedures of DirPiz sequence generation are de-
scribed as following. First, we reassemble different IP packets
if the fragmentation field is set. Due to the limitation of MTU
or potential IP fragment attack, the communication content
can be scattered in multiple IP packets. Reassembling these
fragmented IP packets can restore the real payload in a com-
munication. Second, based on these reassembled IP packets,
the payload sizes are counted according to the upper-level
protocols to form a sequence. This process is mainly adopted
to reduce the influence of low-level protocol details, e.g., TCP
handshake and SSL/TLS negotiation. For UDP protocol, the
length of the transport payload is used. For TCP protocol,
only the length of the transport payload in the packets is used
after the connection is established. For SSL/TLS protocol,
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Figure 2: An example shows the simplified DirPiz sequences of each session with setting L as 6. The training set contains the
malicious traffic generated from Quasar. The testing set contains the mixed traffic generated from Quasar and WhatsApp.
only the length of SSL/TLS payload in the ’Application Data’
packet is used. Third, we append the direction sign to the
elements of payload size sequences. The request information
from a client to the server is formulated as a positive number.
The response information from a server to the client is formu-
lated as a negative number. Fourth, To focus on the automated
handshake as well as the handwave process, and unify the
length of sequences, we only reserve the first L element in
the sequence as well as the last L element to depict the hand-
shake and handwave behavior respectively. For sequences
less than L in length, -1 is used as padding value. After that,
the DirPiz sequences are generated and formatted into two
parts. A real example of extracted DirPiz sequences is shown
in Figure 2. The figure shows two parts of DirPiz sequences.
The Quasar Traffic is used as a training set, and combined
traffic, including Quasar and WhatsApp, is used as a testing
set. For simplification, we set the L as six and only show the
head part for both sets.
4.3 MLTree Construction
In this section, we construct the host behavior structure by
integrating multiple diverse DirPiz sequences into MLTrees.
Corresponding to use two parts of DirPiz sequences to fin-
gerprint a session, we use two MLTrees to represent the host
signature of a sample, including a head MLTree and a tail
MLTree.
As a central structure of our approach, MLTree is defined
as follows,
Definition 1 MLTree MLTree T is a Weighted Directed
Acyclic Graph (WDAG), T = (N,E,CN ,CE), where
N,E,CN ,CE represent the node set, edge set, node weight set,
edge weight set respectively. With different to normal WDAG,
MLTree is organized in hierarchy structure, every weighted
node nli and weighted edge e
l
ibelongs to a level sub-set,
nli ∈ Nl ,eli ∈ E l . And all these level sub-sets Nl ,E l ,ClN ,ClE
consist of corresponding total set N = {Nl}l=0..L,E =
{E l}l=0..L,CN = {ClN}l=0..L,CE = {ClE}l=0..L.
From the definition, it can be seen that the MLTree consists
of four elements. The node set N is used to represent unique
DirPiz grouped by level. The statistical set CN is used to
record the aggregated occurrence of each unique DirPiz or-
ganized in level. The edge set E is used to represent two
co-occurrence DirPiz grouped by two adjacent levels. The
statistical set CE is used to record the co-occurrences of each
two adjacent DirPiz.
Algorithm 1 MLTree Construction
Require: DirPiz Sequence Set P, Max Level L
Ensure: MLTree T
1: Let T = (N,E,CN ,CE)
2: Let N =∅,E =∅,CN =∅,CE =∅
3: for all level l ∈ L do
4: Nl =∅,ClN =∅,E l =∅,E lN =∅
5: for all DirPiz sequence p ∈ P do
6: Nl = Nl ∪{p[l]}, ClN [p[l]]+ = 1
7: if l eq 0 then
8: e = (−1, p[l]),E l = E l ∪{e}, ClE [e]+ = 1
9: else
10: e = (p[l−1], p[l]),E l = E l ∪{e},ClE [e]+ = 1
11: end if
12: end for
13: Append Nl ,ClN ,E
l ,ClE to N,C,CN ,CE
14: end for
15: return T
The MLTree construction process is as follows. First, the
DirPiz sequences are processed level by level. In each level
of processing, the nodes and edges are generated by generat-
ing unique values and corresponding statistics. Then they are
appended to the MLTree. The specific schema is shown in Al-
gorithm 1. Second, merging operations are taken to enhance
the coverage as well as reduce the storage cost of repeated
patterns. The specific merging algorithm is shown in Algo-
rithm 2. However, the merging action contains polluting risk
when integrating too much individual MLTrees into a huge
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Figure 3: Corresponding generated MLTree from Figure 2. The top MLTree is generated from Quasar traffic, and the bottom
MLTree is generated from testing traffic. Ovals denote the MLTree edges, and rectangles denote the MLTree nodes.
Algorithm 2 MLTree Merging
Require: MLTree Set M
Ensure: Merged MLTree T
1: Let T = (N,E,CN ,CE)
2: Let N =∅,E =∅,CN =∅,CE =∅
3: for all level l ∈ L do
4: Nl =∅,ClN =∅,E l =∅,E lN =∅
5: for all MLTree m ∈M do
6: Nl = Nl ∪m.Nl ,E l = E l ∪m.E l
7: for all node n ∈ Nl , edge e ∈ E l do
8: ClN [n]+ = m.C
l
N [n], C
l
E [e]+ = m.C
l
E [e]
9: end for
10: end for
11: Append Nl ,ClN ,E
l ,ClE to N,C,CN ,CE
12: end for
13: return T
MLTree. Because the coverage of the large tree will increase
dramatically, resulting in high-level false alarms. To avoid
this, we limit the merging operation to integrate the DirPiz
sequences generated from the same sample. Thus, similar be-
haviors can be merged, and the scale of the tree can be limited
to a proper extent. After that, the MLTree representing the
host behavior of a sample is produced. As an example, the
corresponding MLTrees generated from Figure 2 are shown
in Figure 3. The first node (68,4) of the top MLTree repre-
sents a total 4 occurrences of DirPiz 68 in the first level of the
training set. Besides, the edge[(68,-228),4] between the first
node (68,4) and the second node (-228,4) of the top MLTree
represents a total 4 co-occurrence of the two DirPiz 68 and
-228.
Briefly, as the host behavior, MLTree provides several ad-
vantages. First, MLTree ensures flexible merging to represent
signatures efficiently. Apart from merging DirPiz, our design
of MLTree can also merge different MLTrees generated from
the same sample. This feature reduces the cost of storing re-
peated signatures; Second, the hierarchy design can represent
the host behavior in an intuitive and reasonable manner. Since
DirPiz sequences can be organized hierarchically to facilitate
the statistics of DirPiz at different communication locations,
automated handshake behavior can be quantified by differ-
entiating between frequent DirPizs and infrequent DirPizs at
each level. Because the frequent DirPiz is with a higher prob-
ability of being generated automatically. Third, MLTree can
be automatically constructed. Both the MLTree construction
and merging can be completed with a systematic script. In
such a manner, the construction requires no interactions with
security experts and prior knowledge, and the labor costs can
be reduced.
5 Detection
Unlike traditional signature-based detection using the exact
matching strategy, our detection relies on the similarity match-
ing strategy to decide if the testing instance should be regarded
as malicious. The steps of detection are as follows. First, the
similarity vector of the testing instance and each signature
is calculated as vm = [s0,s1, ...,sn]. The element in the vector
represents the similarity score of the testing instance and the
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corresponding signature. The specific similarity score calcu-
lation method is elaborated in Section 5.1. Second, we make
a prediction based on the similarity vector to decide if the
testing instance contains malicious behavior. The details of
this step are shown in Section 5.2.
5.1 Similarity Calculation
The first step towards malicious prediction is to produce the
similarity vector of the testing instance. The vector is gener-
ated by comparing the testing instance with each signature in
the set. Moreover, the comparison is achieved based on the
MLTree similarity calculation method. In general, the simi-
larity of two MLtrees consists of two aspects, path similarity
and node similarity. The path similarity measures the sim-
ilarity of continuous edges based on the statistics of edges,
while the node similarity measures the similarity of nodes in
corresponding hierarchies. Specifically, a similarity score S
of the testing instance and a signature is formulated as
S = β[αS f n+(1−α)S f p]+ (1−β)[αSln+(1−α)Sl p] (1)
where S f n and S f p represent the path similarity and the node
similarity of corresponding head MLTree respectively, Sln and
Sl p represent the path similarity and the node similarity of
corresponding tail MLTree respectively, α represents the node
ratio parameter that determines the balance of the node score
and path score, and β represents the head ratio parameter that
determines the balance of the head score and tail score.
5.1.1 Path Similarity
Path similarity is used to measure the common continuous
paths of two MLTrees. Towards achieving this measurement,
we first define common weighted path (CWP) as follows,
Definition 2 Common Weighted Path Given two MLTrees
bt = {Nt ,Et ,CNt ,CEt}, bm= {Nm,Em,CNm,CEm}, a CWP PC
is defined as the intersection of continuous weighted edges
of two MBTress. Specifically, IP = {EI ,CEI}, the edge set EI
is the continuous intersection of the two edge sets Et and Em.
This means ∀1 < l < L, if (nli ,nl+1j ) ∈ E lI , then (nli ,nl+1j ) ∈
(Et ∩Em), and there exists at least one edge (nl−1p ,nli) that
(nl−1p ,nli) ∈ E l−1I . Besides, the statistics set CEI based on EI
is also the intersection of the two statistics sets according to
different levels.
The CWP aims at capturing the common successive sequential
information of two MLTrees. Thus, it is used as the middle-
ware to measure the continuous similarity. The algorithm to
generate CWP of two MLTrees is shown in Algorithm 3.
Then we provide several observations of CWP: (i) the edge
statistics of CWP can reflect the similar level; (ii) the range
of edge statistics at different levels in CWP is inconsistent
since the edge statistics are generated independently; (iii) the
Algorithm 3 CWP Generation
Require: Two MLTree bt = {Nt ,Et ,CNt ,CEt}, and bm =
{Nm,Em,CNm,CEm}, Max Level L.
Ensure: Common weighted path PC
1: Let Pc = {Ec,CEc}
2: Let Ec =∅,CEc =∅
3: for all level l ∈ L do
4: if l is not 0 and E l−1c is ∅ then
5: return Pc
6: end if
7: Let E lc =∅,ClEc =∅,Nltmp = Nlt ∩Nlm
8: if l is not 0 then
9: E lc = E
l
t ∩E lm∩ (Nltmp×Nl−1tmp )
10: else
11: E lc = E
l
t ∩E lm
12: end if
13: for all edge e ∈ E lc do
14: ClEc = min(C
l
Et [e],C
l
Et [e])
15: end for
16: end for
17: return Pc
range of edge statistics at the same level in different CWP
is inconsistent, since the testing instance may contain the
traffic generated from a different period than signature traffic;
(iv) it is of low probability to produce a long CWP between
two unrelated MLTree. As a matter of fact, two unrelated
MLTree may contain the same DirPiz at a level; however,
they can hardly contain the same edges or even continuous
edges through different levels. Thus, in general, a longer CWP
indicates a higher level similarity comparing to a short CWP;
and the corresponding level can be used as a weight factor of
the statistics.
Next, we synthesize the observations of CWP and provide
several considerations to design the formula for path similar-
ity: (i) a higher similarity score should indicate more similar
the two MLTrees are. To achieve this, we design a weighted
product mechanism to ensure the monotonically increasing
of the score with edge statistics and corresponding hierarchy
level. (ii) the edge statistics should be normalized to be used
as the base factor of the score. Specifically, we use the edge
statistics of signatures at the corresponding level to normal-
ize that of testing instance; thus, the impact of the difference
among levels can be eliminated. Besides, we also introduce a
time ratio to balance the period difference between the testing
instance and the signature. (iii) the hierarchy level should be
used as a weight factor for edge statistics. To leverage the
continuous property of CWP, we assign different weights to
statistics at different levels. Thus a longer CWP can corre-
spond to higher similarity.
Based on these considerations, we tried several schemes
and performed experiments on a small training set. Finally,
7
Path Similarity
(68, 3) (-228, 3) (68, 3) (68, 1)
(-516, 1)
(68, 1)
(68, 1)
(-516, 1)
Node Similarity
Similarity Score
Calculating
[(68,-228), 3]
[(-228,68), 3]
[(68,68), 1]
[(68,-516), 1]
[(-516,68), 1]
3 3 3 1 2 2
6 ( )
4 4 4 4 4 32 812
+ + + + + +

2 2 2 2 21 2 3 43 3 1
5
1 1
6 ( )
4
5
5 54 354 452 812
 + +  +  + + 

Figure 4: Similarity calculation of two MLTree in Figure 3. The top shows the CWP of the two MLTree and corresponding path
similarity. The bottom shows the schematic diagram to calculate node similarity. Both Rt is set 1 in calculation.
we found the best result is achieved by the formula as follows,
sp = 2
L′
∑
l=1
[1+
F(El ,ClE )
F(Elm,C
l
Em)∗Rt
]× l2L
where L′ denotes the max level of CWP, l
2
L denotes the level
important factor, the F(E
l ,ClE )
F(E lm,C
l
Em)∗Rt
denotes the normalized
level path similarity factor, F(a,b) represents counting the
total occurrence of all elements of a in set b, and Rt denotes
the time ratio to normalize.
5.1.2 Node Similarity
Node similarity is used to measure the common nodes of two
MLTrees in corresponding hierarchies. As preliminary, we
define the Common Nodes as follows.
Definition 3 Common Nodes The common nodes NI are de-
fined as the intersection nodes and their corresponding mini-
mal occurrence at each level, formally, IN = {NI ,CNI},∀l <
L→ NlI ⊆ (Nlt ∩Nlm),ClNI ⊆ (ClNt ∩ClNm).
Totally, the node similarity is calculated based on the common
nodes. Unlike CWP, common nodes are generated indepen-
dently through different levels. Thus, the nodes are treated
equally to contribute to the diverse similarity of two ML-
Trees. Specifically, correspond to produce path similarity, the
formula to calculate node similarity is as follows,
sn = 2
L
∑
l=1
(1+min(
F(Nl ,ClN )
F(Nlm,C
l
Nm)∗Rt
),1)
where min( F(N
l ,ClN)
F(Nlm,C
l
Nm)∗Rt
,1) denotes the normalized level node
similarity factor.
Unlike the path similarity measurement, the node similarity
is rather simple to facilitate robust detection ability. From one
perspective, although the path similarity can accurately mea-
sure a similar path, it is not flexible enough to capture rough
similar patterns. Generally, dynamically generated payloads
exist in the handshake procedure, like the inspection results
of the victim machine transferred by the RAT client to the
server. These dynamic payloads can truncate the CWP for its
random DirPiz. Hence, in such a situation, node similarity
can be used as a supplementary to the path similarity to avoid
false negatives. From another perspective, to avoid the global
impact of explosive conflict in a single level, we limit the
level node similarity factor in each level to the range of [1,2].
Thus though there exists, the influence can be limited to an
acceptable level to avoid false positives.
A brief example describing the similarity calculation of
two MLTrees in Figure 3 is shown in Figure 4. The calcu-
lated path similarity is around 812, and node similarity is
also around 812. It should be noted that in the figure, we
only showed the head MLTree comparison, and an overall
similarity should also consist of the tail MLTree comparison
according to Equation 1.
5.2 Prediction
Based on the produced similarity vector Sm, we can further
predict the testing instance. First, the max value Sm of the
vector vm is specified and regarded as the malicious value
of the testing instance. Then, if the Sm exceeds a predefined
threshold θ, the testing instance is regarded as containing ma-
licious behaviors. Otherwise, the testing instance is regarded
as benign. In addition, in the situation that the testing instance
is regarded as malicious, the specific type of malicious behav-
ior can also be predicted based on the index of the malicious
value Im. It is worth to mention that the specific encryption
RAT type will only be decided when Sm exceeds the threshold
θ. Otherwise, it is meaningless to predict the specific RAT
type since the traffic is regarded as benign.
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6 Evaluation Framework
6.1 Evaluation Data
In our experiment, two malicious parts and two benign parts
of traffic are used for experiments. The two malicious parts
consist of the open source RATs traffic collected by ourselves,
and the wild Trojan traffic selected from the Stratosphere
project [36]. The two parts benign applications traffic consist
of the ISCX VPN2016 [10], and the USTC-TFC2016 [42].
Each part is described below.
Open Source Encryption RAT (OSER) To avoid be-
ing traced, it is popular to adopt customized OSER for
attack[15, 45]. Thus, the open-version RAT traffic is stud-
ied to observe their basic malicious activities. Based on pop-
ularity, stability, and maintenance on Github, 7 OSERs are
selected to generate this part of the traffic. Specifically, in
Platfrom Name Transport N1/N2
Linux
pupy
cleartext 500/500
obfs3 300/500
http 100/100
SSL 100/100
ECM 100/100
RSA 500/500
EC4+ECPV+RC4 100/100
websock+RSA+AES 100/100
Metasploit staged meterpreter 200/500stageless meterpreter 400/500
Windows
Koadic https 150/300
Covenant EKE+SSL 150/300
Stitch AES 250/200
QuasarRAT TLS 100/100
Lime-RAT AES 100/100
Table 1: Selected open source RATs for generating malicious
traffic. N1 denotes the session number in victim 1 as the
training set. N2 denotes the session number in victim 2 as the
testing set.
the traffic generation procedure, to evaluate whether a RAT
follows the same procedure for communication in different
environments, we collect the traffic of two hosts, which install
different systems but are infected by the same sample. The
traffic generation mechanism is shown in Figure 5. Besides,
to simulate the practice usage of samples, 5 randomly chosen
commands are executed on the comprised machine for each
malicious session. As a result, the details of the collected
traffic are shown in Table 1.
Wild Trojan (WT) Apart from the OSER traffic, wild tro-
jans (from 2015 to 2018) are also selected from [36] as eval-
uation. Compared to OSER traffic, the WT traffic contains
more number of sessions. However, since the communication
between the victim and Trojan C&C cannot be controlled as
detailed as OSER, it may also contain noise traffic generated
by the machine automatically. Nevertheless, this part of the
traffic is also a fair test to evaluate the WT detection ability
of MBTree. More details of this part of the traffic are shown
Host /Attacker
Client 2 / Victim 2Client 1 / Victim 1
Traffic Capture
(Win7/Debian) (Win10/CentOS7)
Figure 5: Traffic collection.
in Table 2.
Name Time Session Num Host Num
TrickBot 2015.3-2018.4 152680 7
Emotet 2017.6 344850 9
Dridex 2017.3-2017.4 106427 13
Trickster 2017.6-2018.1 67301 3
Upatre 2015.10-2016.5 114921 2
Table 2: An overview of the WT traffic.
ISCX VPN2016 In recent studies, the ISCX VPN2016 is
widely used for encrypted traffic classification. In this paper,
we also adopt this set as a part of benign traffic to evaluate
the false alarm levels. Totally, the set organizes the 27G raw
traffic generated from 17 typical applications in 150 pcap or
pcapng files. Compared to former malicious parts, this benign
application set is more large.
USTC-TFC2016 Apart from ISCX VPN2016, we also use
the benign part of USTC-TFC2016 as another part of benign
traffic, because it contains different applications traffic from
the ISCX VPN2016. Actually, this part of traffic consists of
both benign and malicious traffic. Since the traffic contained
in the malicious part of USTC-TFC2016 are relatively old
(from 2011 to 2015), they are not taken as malicious part.
Thus, only the benign part of the set is used for evaluation.
Totally, the benign part of the USTC-TFC2016 organizes the
3.71GB traffic generated from 10 applications in 14 pcaps.
6.2 Data Organization
We organize the four parts of the collected traffic into two
datasets for evaluation. Each dataset consists of malicious
traffic and benign traffic. The OSER is used as malicious
traffic in the dataset I, and the WT is used in dataset II. The
benign traffic shared by two datasets is the combination of
ISCX VPN2016 and USTC-TFC2016.
For persuasive evaluation, we use the 5-fold cross-
evaluation strategy to acquire a stable performance. More-
over, in each fold, the dataset is divided into three parts, train,
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Dataset I Dataset II
Train Validation Test Train Validation Test
Malicious • • ? . . .
Benign   ◦   ◦
Table 3: This table shows the partitioning details in each
dataset. The • denotes the OSR traffic generated from Debian
and ? generated from CentOS; . denotes the WT traffic; and
◦ denote different applications traffic from the combination
set of ISCX VPN2016 and USTC-TFC2016.
validation, and test. Basically, the three parts in a fold are
divided following the ratio of 0.49:0.21:0.3. It is noteworthy
that since OSER is generated from two machines, we use the
traffic generated from one machine as the train and validation
sets respectively, and from the other machine as the test set.
Besides, the benign applications that appeared in the train set
do not appear in the test set. This partitioning strategy aims
at simulating the unknown applications that emerged in the
test environment, which scenario is common in reality. The
partition details are shown in Table 3.
6.3 Baselines
In correspondence to the related studies in Section 2, six
baselines are covered in this paper as comparisons. The first
baseline is a machine learning state-of-the-art [35] using side-
channel features and CART represented as CART. The second
baseline is another machine learning based state-of-the-art
[13] using different features from [35] with random forest
for Trickbot Trojan detection as RF. The third baseline is
the extended features generated by CICFlowmeter [1] with
GradientBoosting implemented by ourselves as GBDT-CIC.
The fourth baseline is a deep learning method using a hierar-
chy LSTM as the architecture implemented by ourselves as
LSTM-LSTM. The fifth baseline is a sophisticated deep learn-
ing based state-of-the-art [9] combining the content analytics
and time analytics as CETAnalytics. Besides, we also imple-
ment the flow-level similar matching method using the cosine
distance and threshold of 0.99 represented as DirPiz-Seq to
illustrate the advantage of the host-level signatures. Moreover,
we try to compare our method with ping-pong [39], which
is a signature-based state-of-the-art for encrypted IOT traf-
fic event identification. However, we find that ping-pong can
hardly extract packet-level signatures of malicious traffic. Be-
cause the conversation pairs of packet-level signatures are too
diverse to be clustered by the DBSCAN algorithm though we
try to tune corresponding parameters.
6.4 Tasks & Metrics
Based on the aforementioned data, we propose the detection
task for experiments. The goal of the task is to classify the
traffic as generated from the general benign application or
which specific malicious application. Specifically, the mali-
cious traffic is labeled as the specific type at the prediction.
However, for benign traffic, they are all regarded equally as
general benign without further classifying the specific appli-
cation type.
In the experiment, four well-known metrics are adopted
for comprehensive evaluation: Accuracy (Acc), F1, Precision
(Pr), Recall (Rc) [30]. Specifically, the macro version of the
later three metrics are used to reveal the averaged performance
in predicting different classes.
7 Experiment
In this section, we provide a thorough evaluation of MBTree
from three perspectives based on the aforementioned dataset.
First, we perform the evaluation on the detection task to show
the effectiveness of the proposed MBTree with comparing
to several machine-learning based state-of-the-art. Second,
we conduct experiments to show the influence of the hyper-
parameters. Further, we show the analysis of the generated
signatures to reveal the network behavior differences among
different samples. The hyperparameters of MBTree are set
preliminary as max level L of 10, path similarity ratio α of
0.3, head signature ratio β of 0.7, and threshold θ as 512.
7.1 Malicious Detection
In this section, we focus on presenting the overall effective-
ness of the proposed method MBTree. For each dataset, we
first introduce the characteristics of the dataset and then show
the overall superiority of our method by comparing the per-
formance with other methods. It is noteworthy that since the
concern of the paper is to detect malicious traffic rather than
traffic classification, we only use the malicious traffic to build
the signatures.
Dataset I In this dataset, the distribution of malicious and
benign traffic is extremely unbalanced. Specifically, the OSER
set contains exceedingly little traffic comparing to the other
two public benign sets. Besides, as shown in Table 3, apart
from that the benign traffic is generated from different appli-
cations in the training set and test set; the malicious traffic
may also deviate between the two parts. Because they are
produced from different OSs. Thus this dataset is a rigorous
test for different methods.
The experiment results of this dataset are shown in Table 4.
First, as a high-level performance comparison, it is apparent
that the MBTree outperforms all the considered elements of
comparison in both validation set and testing set in all metrics.
Specifically, MBTree can achieve around 99% of Acc and F1
on the test set, which is a relatively high performance. This re-
sult demonstrate the effectiveness of MBTree design. Second,
comparing the performance on validation set and test set, the
signature methods including #0 and #4 performs more stable.
While machine learning and deep learning methods performs
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Validation Set Test Set
Method Acc(%) F1(%) Pr(%) Rc(%) Acc(%) F1(%) Pr(%) Rc(%)
MBTree 99.85±0.16 97.73±4.03 98.59±1.72 98.5±2.75 † 99.46±0.37 99.24±0.14 99.02±0.23 99.49±0.03
CART [35] 99.58±0.92 † 97.67±4.32 † 98.3±2.79 † 98.61±2.46 63.57±28.05 65.25±10.66 73.01±9.5 67.81±9.07
RF [13] 99.36±0.94 74.31±20.19 76.15±20.25 75±19.54 56.85±20.29 46.94±2.21 59.57±0.71 46.68±3.79
GBDT-CIC 99.04±0.75 51.87±14.12 53.38±16.42 55.4±11.48 53.31±22.03 27.41±9.15 33.68±10.66 30.39±9.04
LSTM-LSTM 80.52±2.38 5.95±0.1 5.37±0.16 6.67±0 40.28±20.8 3.62±1.72 6.67±0 2.69±1.39
CETAnalytics [9] 88.24±1.47 49.39±0.01 48.38±0 53.33±0 49.44±24.24 13.36±2.51 17.9±4.21 11.26±2.15
DirPiz 80.21±9.68 83.08±1.86 81.26±2.02 92.18±2.92 84.53±3.1 † 81.18±2.15 † 81.98±2.44 † 89.41±0.82 †
Table 4: Results on Dataset I. Highlighted values: overall best method, second best method (†).
Validation Set Test Set
Method Acc(%) F1(%) Pr(%) Rc(%) Acc(%) F1(%) Pr(%) Rc(%)
MBTree 99.92±0.15 91.42±2.77 85.76±3.97 99.99±0.03 98.89±1.35 89.96±4.45 91.48±7.32 91.17±0.18
CART [35] 95.67±1.1 92.41±2.04 93.07±1.68 91.86±2.33 68.19±17.99 † 44.19±17.2 47.7±13.48 49.84±19.82
RF [13] 95.92±0.48 96.07±0.86 † 96.8±0.37 95.45±1.27 67.62±13.01 50.04±9.89 59.23±7.02 † 55.15±11.62
GBDT-CIC 96.98±0.75 96.45±1.61 96.65±1.23 † 96.31±1.95 † 65.39±16.17 51.2±11.39 † 59.15±12.6 55.2±8.37
LSTM-LSTM 33.9±18.04 6.87±3.4 4.84±2.58 14.29±0 77.75±2.63 12.49±0.24 14.29±0 11.11±0.38
CETAnalytics [9] 71.78±6.09 50.24±5.05 71.53±9.05 47.16±3.05 87±4.2 38.26±12.65 38.61±11.02 51.9±15.83
DirPiz 58.2±9.39 56.33±3.7 59.73±4.77 64.53±6.47 52.84±2.15 52±2.28 58.04±5.65 60.18±3.29 †
Table 5: Results on Dataset II. Highlighted values: overall best method, second best method (†).
poor on validation set and even worse on the test set. This
result can be mainly attributed to the limited and unbalanced
training instance in OSR. In such a situation, these state-of-
the-arts can hardly achieve satisfied performance. At the mean
time, MBTree can properly handle the few training instances
with the proposed similar matching mechanism, which can en-
hance the coverage of the similar behaviors without triggering
false alarms.
Dataset II In this dataset, the malicious traffic is provided
by WT. Compared to OSER, WT contains more number of
malicious traffic. Besides, in this dataset, only the distribution
of benign traffic may deviate between the validation set and
the test set. While the malicious traffic is divided as the same
into three sets with a ratio of 0.49:0.21:0.3.
The experiment results on this dataset are shown in Table 5.
First, MBTree still performs stable in this dataset, which can
achieve around 99% Acc and 90% F1 on both validation set
and test set. It should be noted that MBTree is not achiev-
ing the high performance as in Dataset I. With analyzing the
detection results, we observe that most of the misclassified
instances in Dataset II consists of shorter communication
sequences, which means there are only one or two valid pay-
loads exchanged between the client and C&C. In such a case,
we suspect there is no active connection established due to
the silence of C&C. Second, the machine learning methods
perform notably different on the validation set and test set.
Although they can achieve above 95% Acc and above 90%
F1 on the validation set, they can hardly handle the unknown
applications and thus perform poorly in the test set. These
results illustrate that the machine learning based methods are
more susceptible to the change of the environment, though
the malicious traffic for validation and test are produced from
the same distribution. Third, it can be noticed that though
DirPiz-Seq performs well in Dataset I, it performs poorly in
this dataset. The phenomenon indicates that only utilizing
the flow level communication sequences as signatures is not
enough. And the sophisticated design of integrating multiple
flow-level sequences into host-level MLTree with correspond-
ing similar matching mechanism performs considerably in
case of sizeable malicious traffic. Fourth, although deep learn-
ing has become one of the hot research directions at present,
we can see from our experiments that this technique (1) per-
forms poorly with only limited training instances, and (2) has
poor generalization ability to be adopted in practice.
As an overall assessment, MBTree outperforms all machine
learning based state-of-the-art in both test sets. This demon-
strates the robust detection ability in different environments,
especially in the extreme case of limited and unbalanced train-
ing instances.
Efficiency Evaluation As a comprehensive evaluation, we
also record the prediction time of each method as an efficiency
comparison. The results are shown in Table 6. Compared with
machine learning based approaches, MBTree cost more time
for predictions than CART and RandomForest. With analyz-
ing the workflow of the matching mechanism, we find that
the main cost of our approach comes from the intersection
operation in calculating the similarity score. In python, which
we used for implementing MBTree, the average complexity of
the intersection operation of two sets is O(min(a,b)), where
a,b refers to the length of the sets. Actually, this can be opti-
mized by other algorithms to reduce the cost. For example,
[8] have shown that the complexity of the intersection can be
reduced to O((a+b)/
√
w), where w is the number of bits in
a machine word. This remains as future work.
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Methods MBTree CART RF GBDT-CIC LSTM-LSTM CETAnalytics DirPiz-Seq
Time (s) 10−3 10−7 10−5 10−3 10−3 10−2 10−1
Table 6: Prediction time of different methods for per instance.
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Figure 6: Different parameter tunning results. DI represents the performance on Dataset I, and DII represents the performance on
Dataset II.
7.2 Parameter Tunning
In this section, we take experiments on the hyperparameters
of MBTree to analyze their influences. Totally, there are four
parameters, Max Level L, Scores Ratio α,β and the Threshold
θ. As adopted in previous experiments, we continue to use
the default settings as start, L = 10, alpha = 0.3, beta = 0.7
and threshold = 512. Results are shown in Figure 6.
Max Level θ The max level θ determines how deep should
two MLTree be compared. Ideally, L is supposed to be set
as exactly the length of the automated handshake procedure.
However, since the handshake process implementation varies
from each other, it requires experiments on L to determine
the most appropriate value. Considering L and θ are closely
related, we thus choose the best performance through different
θ as the result of L. The results are shown in Figure 6(a).
Based on the trend of the curves, it can be noticed that the
most appropriate value of L should be chosen at the interval
[3,10], which can achieve high Acc and F1 on both datasets.
Node Score Ratio α The score ratio α determines the
balance of the path score and node score. Specifically, α rep-
resents the ratio of the node score. The results are shown in
Figure 6(b). It can be noticed that the performance rise with α
increasing at the initial on both datasets. This can be mainly
attributed to the existence of the dynamic DirPiz in the com-
munication sequence, which truncating the CWP. Hence, we
suggest that the α should be set greater than 0.1 under normal
conditions to facilitate robust detection.
Head Score Ratio β The parameter β determines the bal-
ance of the head score and tail score. Specifically, β repre-
sents the ratio of the head score. The results are shown in
Figure 6(c). As shown in the figure, the performances on both
datasets rise with β increasing. Thus, it can be derived that the
patterns of the handshake process are rather obvious. With the
analysis of the traffic, it can be observed that the handshake
process is sophisticated. The two points change information
after establishing the TCP connection (e.g., the system infor-
mation). However, it is rather simple in the handwave process.
The server only sends one or two packets to notify the client
that the connection is closing, and then the rest work is handed
over to the TCP level. Hence, we suggest that the β should
be set greater than 0.5 without extra prior knowledge about
samples.
Threshold θ The parameter θ determines the alarm level.
In this experiment, we observe the performance of different θ
with setting max level L as 10. The results are shown in Fig-
ure 6(d). It can be observed from the figure that the best perfor-
mance is achieved at around 512, which is slightly above the
min threshold value 0.7× (0.3× 210)+ 0.3× (0.7× 210) =
430.08. Errors below this level are mainly caused by false
negatives, which means that most of the real malicious in-
stances are regarded as benign; and errors above this level are
mainly caused by false negatives, which means that most of
the misclassified instances are false alarms.
7.3 Generated Signatures
In this section, we analyze the signature MLTrees to inspect
the differences among samples by counting the number of
unique values at each level. The statistics are shown in Fig-
ure 7. In this experiment, the max level L is set as 30, which
is a relatively deeper value for the handshake procedure.
First, it is apparent that the unique number of most signa-
tures is less than 50 through different levels. This appearance
indicates that for most of the malicious signatures, it cost
less to record the packet size as patterns. Obviously, pupy-
obfs3 shows a different trend from most of the others. The
DirPizs unique number of this sample is relatively high at the
start of the communication. This can be attributed to that the
obfs3 achieves the traffic obfuscation in the handshake proce-
dure by changing the packet size distribution [16]. However,
even though the obfuscation technology is adopted to random-
ize the packet size, MBTree can also effectively identify the
traffic. This can be attributed to the limited range of DirPiz
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(h) Tail Edges
Figure 7: Number of unique values of nodes and edges organized hierarchically in the generated MLTree signatures. Fig-
ure 7(a), 7(b), 7(e), 7(f) are generated from OSER signatures. Figure 7(c), 7(d), 7(g), 7(h) are generated from WT signatures.
after randomization. Since the randomize strategy of obfs3
is applied as using random length of bytes to pad the rest of
the packet, the length of the padded DirPiz can be only in
the interval [raw_content_length,MTU ] according to [6, 40].
Thus our designed node similarity can still cover the padded
DirPiz sequences. Second, comparing the head nodes with tail
nodes, it is apparent that most samples use the same packets
to complete the handshake process. Thus, it can be deduced
that the head patterns are slightly identical. This conclusion
is also in accord with what we acquired in the experiment of
α. Third, rough automatic handshake length can be deduced
based on the change points of the curves. For example, pupy-
obfs3, msf-1, Dridex, and TrickBot accomplish the handshake
process through 5 message exchanges.
8 Discussion
In the previous section, the experiment results illustrate that
even though the content is transferred through encrypted trans-
port, MBTree can also identify malicious communications.
However, sophisticated attack strategies can still be taken by
adversaries to paralysis or evade MBTree. Here we discuss
the strategies that can be used against MBTree.
Disguising Attack A potential attack strategy for MBTree
is disguising malicious traffic as benign applications. When
adopting this strategy, though the malicious traces can also
be identified, it will pollute MLTree signatures and result
in a large number of false alarms to cripple the MBTree.
However, in order to implement such a strategy, it requires
the adversaries (i) to acquire which benign application is
running; (ii) to keep on the update of the benign applications’
behaviors, which is hard to achieve in practice.
Malformed Packet Since MBTree relies on successful
payload identification, the evading techniques exploiting
the protocol stack parsing procedure can be used to evade
MBTree[24, 43]. For example, transfer content through RST
packets. When adopting such a technique, the payload can be
incorrectly reassembled by the man-in-the-middle MBTree,
and the malicious patterns cannot be identified. However, im-
plementing this strategy also requires extra protocol stack
control to deal with the malformed packets correctly. Besides,
these malformed packets can be easily identified by a tradi-
tional firewall or IDS.
Obfuscation Attack Although our experiment proves that
our MBTree can resist the obfuscation strategy to some ex-
tent, it will still lead to the invalidity of MBTree in the face
of a highly targeted attack strategy. A potential obfuscation
strategy is radically splitting the padded content into several
packets with random packet size. In the case of such a strat-
egy, not only MBTree will be polluted resulting in high-level
false alarms, but also the sample can evade the detection of
MBTree with unseen DirPiz sequences. To against this rad-
ical strategy, the entropy analysis of the DirPiz sequences
can be used. Since benign applications also follow a specific
procedure to complete the handshake, it is abnormal that the
entropy of DirPiz sequences of a host is exceedingly high in
the case of only running a few benign applications.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we present the MBTree, a novel signature based
approach that integrates DirPiz sequences as MLTree sig-
natures with the similarity matching mechanism to detect
encrypted RAT traffic. We evaluate MBTree against several
OSERs’ traffic and WTs’ traffic with comprehensive benign
applications’ traffic as background. The results show that
MBTree can detect different malicious traffic in different en-
vironments with a high-level accuracy.
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